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ARGUMENT 
I. YOUNG LIVING'S "INTEGRATION CLAUSE" DOES NOT INSULATE IT 
FROM THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly recognized that a 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may result 
from an obligation, express or implied, which arises not from the 
language of the contract, but from the course of dealings and 
conduct of the parties. See, e.g., Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 
24, f 44, 20 P.3d 876; Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 955 (Utah 
1998); St. Benedicts Dev. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 
200 (Utah 1991); and Andolex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 
1041, 1048 (Utah App. 1994). For example, in Brown the Supreme 
Court explained that 
"[i]n determining whether a party has breached the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, we are not limited to an 
examination of the express contractual provisions; we will 
also consider the course of dealing between the parties." 
973 P.2d at 954 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, Young Living fails to address this line of 
cases and asserts that the trial court properly refused to 
consider the parties' conduct and course of dealings in the case 
at bar because the agreement at issue contains a "clear 
integration clause." Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in 
Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326, Young 
Living contends that "[i]f there is a clear integration clause, 
1 
the parties' course of dealing may not be used to add implied 
terms."1 Young Living's reliance is misplaced. 
Tangren is easily distinguishable from the case at bar. 
That case did not involve a claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and it did not address 
the Rawson, Brown, St. Benedicts Development, Andolex Resources 
line of cases. More importantly, as the Tangren Court 
recognized, the parol evidence rule has a "very narrow 
application," and operates only to exclude evidence of statements 
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated agreement. Id. at 1 11 (quoting Hall v. Process 
Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995)). 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, inheres in 
every contract as a matter of law. See, e.g., Markham v. 
Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, 1 18, 173 P.3d 865. Because the 
covenant was already part of the contract at issue in this case, 
it follows that Mr. Marin's testimony in support of his claim for 
breach of the covenant was not "offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of" the contract. 
The trial court, therefore, erred in concluding that the 
parol evidence rule barred Mr. Marin's testimony. 
1Brief of Appellee at p. 14. 
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II. MR. MARIN'S TESTIMONY DOES NOT LACK FOUNDATION. 
Young Living also relies on the trial court's statement that 
Mr. Marin's "assertions of Plaintiff's representations lack 
foundation as to the circumstances including who made the 
purported representation or representations and when such 
representations were made."2 Unfortunately, Young Living fails 
to provide any analysis, explanation or support for this 
statement. 
In point of fact, Mr. Marin's testimony is, for the most 
part, very clear as to who made the representations and when they 
were made: 
4 . ... plaintiff represented to me that it was nearing 
completion of a new mainstream marketing website, recruiting 
DVD, audio CD, and other marketing materials (hereinafter 
referred to as the "marketing tools"). It was clearly 
understood by both plaintiff and myself that these marketing 
tools would be absolutely necessary in order for me to be 
able to meet my performance guarantees under the Agreement 
and it was represented to me that they would be available 
for use by February 1, 2005. 
7. On or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed 
to provide the marketing tools as promised, I contacted Gary 
Young, plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David 
Stirling, plaintiffs' Chief Operating Officer, with my 
growing concerns about my ability to meet the performance 
guarantees. Mr. Young and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that 
plaintiff had failed to perform as promised, assured me that 
my inability to satisfy the performance guarantees would not 
2Brief of Appellee at p. 17-18 (quoting from the trial 
court's March 26, 2008 Order (R. 462)). 
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iffeet my receipt of the advance payment of $25,000 due 
'ebruary 15, 2005, and expressed their confidence that the 
larketing tools would be ready for my use by mid-February to 
>arly March 2005. 
8. On or about March 16, 2005, Steve Bentley, 
laintiff's Chief Financial Officer, informed me that due to 
y failure to meet the March 15, 2005 performance guarantee, 
laintiff was considering withholding further payment to me 
nder the Agreement. In response, I made it very clear to 
r. Bentley that my failure to satisfy the performance 
uarantee was the unavoidable result of plaintiff s failure 
o provide the promised marketing tools, that I could and 
ould meet my performance guarantees when the tools were 
rovided, and that I expected plaintiff to continue making 
ayment to me in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. 
r. Bentley acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to 
erform as promised, represented that plaintiff anticipated 
hat its website would be completed within approximately two 
aeks, and stated that plaintiff would be making a partial 
15,000 payment to me. 
9. On April 12, 2005, I spoke again with Gary Young 
sgarding plaintiff s failure to provide the marketing 
DOIS. Mr. Young responded by telling me that he would "get 
3 the bottom" of the problem and see what he could do. 
10. Despite its acknowledgment that it had failed to 
rovide me with the marketing tools which I needed to do my 
3b, and despite its requests that I remain patient while it 
)ntinued in its efforts to provide the marketing tools, 
Laintiff failed to pay me $10,000 of the advance payment 
ae March 15, 2005 in accordance with paragraph 4 of the 
jreement and failed to make any of the $25,000 advance 
lyment due to be paid to me on April 15, 2005. 
11. On April 26, 2005, I telephoned Mr. Stirling 
jgarding plaintiff's failure to provide the promised 
irketing tools. Mr. Stirling again assured me that they 
mid be provided soon and again requested my patience. 
12. On May 3, 2007, Mr. Stirling notified me that he 
id received an e-mail from Rainmaker Consulting (i.e., 
rohn's folks) "which indicated they are making progress" on 
ie website. Mr. Stirling asked me to "hold tight". A copy 
the e-mail is attached hereto. Thus, 49 days after 
aintiff stopped making payments to me in accordance with 
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the Agreement, plaintiff acknowledged that it had still not 
provided me with the marketing tools which were absolutely 
essential for me to be able to do my job and again requested 
my continued patience. 
13. On or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still 
not provided any of the marketing tools which I needed in 
order to do my job, I spoke with Mr. Young and informed him 
that I believed I had been patient long enough in waiting 
for the repeatedly promised marketing tools and that I could 
no longer afford to continue to my contractual relationship 
with plaintiff. 
(R. 0125-0122)(emphasis added). 
Even if there is some foundational problem with Mr. Marin's 
testimony, for purposes of opposing summary judgment the 
nonmoving party need not produce evidence "in a form that would 
be admissible at trial," so long as the content and substance of 
the evidence would be admissible. Thomas v. International 
Business Machines, 48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Celotex Corp. v. Catret, All U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 
(1986), and citing Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264, 1267-68 
(7th Cir. 1994)). For example, hearsay testimony and 
generalized, unsubstantiated, non-personal affidavits are not 
sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. (citations omitted). 
Mr. Marin's testimony does not suffer from any of these 
deficiencies. It is not hearsay because it is based upon 
admissions by a party-opponent, Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), 
and it is clearly based upon his own personal, specific 
knowledge. 
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Accordingly, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that his 
testimony is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 
III. THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
Young Living does not attempt to defend the trial court's 
award of $43,903 in attorney fees in this relatively simple 
breach of contract case in which neither party conducted any 
discovery and which was decided on summary judgment. Nor does 
Young Living attempt to justify its failure to "categorize the 
time and fees expended for ^successful claims for which there may 
be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for 
which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims 
been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement 
to attorney fees.'" Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 5132, 130 P.3 
325 (quoting Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). 
Finally, Young Living does not explain why it is entitled to 
thousands of dollars in attorney fees incurred in connection with 
matters upon which it did not prevail. See Foote v. Clark, 962 
P.2d 52, 57 (Utah 1998)("the court should not reimburse counsel 
for time spent pursuing ungrounded and infeasible theories of 
recovery); and Gardner v. Madsen, 949 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997)(trial court should make adjustments to fee request so 
that the prevailing party "does not recover fees attributable to 
issues on which he did not prevail"). Instead, Young Living 
relies on Rule 7(f)(2) to support its contention that Mr. Marin 
6 
failed to preserve the issue of attorney fees for appeal. Mr. 
Marin respectfully submits that Young Living misreads the Rules. 
Mr. Marin believes that the following time-line may be 
helpful to understanding the flaw in Young Living's argument. 
1. The Order granting Young Living's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was entered March 26, 2008. (R. 462) That 
Order, however, was not a final judgment because it 
"adjudicat[ed] fewer than all [of Young Living's] claims." Rule 
54 (b) , URCP. 
2. Accordingly, on May 27, 2008, Young Living filed the 
following documents with the trial court: 
a. Motion for Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action 
b. Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action 
c. Proposed Final Judgment 
d. Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs 
(R. 492, 502 and 505) 
3. In accordance with Rules 6(a), 6(e), and 7(c)(1), URCP, 
Mr. Marin had until June 13, 2008, in which to file his 
memorandum in response to Young Living's Motion for Order of 
Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth 
and Sixth Causes of Action. 
4. Mr. Marin timely filed his objection to Young Living's 
attorney fee affidavit and to the provision for attorney fees and 
7 
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Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In support of its contention that Mr. Marin failed to 
preserve the issue of attorney fees for appeal, Young Living 
relies on the Rule 7(f)(2) requirement that "[o]bjections to the 
proposed order shall be filed within five days after service." 
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that Young Living misreads the 
Rule. The "five day" requirement applies only to orders served 
upon the other parties within "fifteen days after the court's 
decision" and does not apply to a "proposed order submitted with 
an initial memorandum." This is so for a number of reasons. 
First, it does not make sense that an objection to a "proposed 
order submitted with an initial memorandum" would be required to 
be filed in half the time allowed by Rule 7(c)(1), URCP, in which 
to file a memorandum in response to the initial memorandum 
itself. Second, Rule 7(f)(2) specifically excludes from its time 
limitations those situations like the case at bar where "the 
court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum." Third, the time; for filing objections contained in 
the second sentence of Rule 7(f)(2) runs from the time of 
"service," it does not run from the time a proposed order is 
"submitted" within an initial memorandum: 
... the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after 
the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a 
proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. 
Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five 
days after service. 
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Rule 7(f) (2) , URCP.3 
In short, Rule 7(f)(2) does not specify a time limitation 
for filing an objection to a "proposed order submitted with an 
initial memorandum," and it would not be reasonable to interpret 
that Rule to require an objection to a proposed order submitted 
with an initial memorandum to be filed in half the time allowed 
for filing a response to the initial memorandum itself. 
Accordingly, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that his objection to 
Young Living's fee affidavit and the award of attorney fees 
contained in the Proposed Final Judgment (which was filed two 
days prior to the deadline for responding to Young Living's 
motion) was timely filed. 
However, even if Young Living is correct that Mr. Marin's 
objections were filed later than required by Rule 7, they were 
still sufficient to preserve the issue of attorney fees for 
appeal. In Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 
67, 68 P.3d 1015, the Court explained that "for an issue to be 
sufficiently raised ... it must at least be raised to a level of 
3It is likewise clear that the time limits set forth in the 
final sentence of Rule 7(f)(2) apply only to proposed orders 
"served" within fifteen days after the court's decision, and do 
not apply to proposed orders "submitted" with an initial 
memorandum: "The party preparing the order shall file the 
proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon 
expiration of the time to object." It would, of course, be 
absurd to read the final sentence to require the filing of a 
proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum again "upon 
being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to 
object." 
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consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." Id. at 
f 19 (quotations and citations omitted). Two policy 
considerations underlie the rule that issues not raised before 
the trial court may not be raised on appeal: 
First, the rule exists to give the trial court an 
opportunity to address the claimed error. [quotations and 
citations omitted] Second, requiring preservation of an 
issue prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial for 
strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if the 
strategy fails. 
Tschaggeny v. Millbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, f 20, 163 P.3d 615. 
In the instant case, there is no suggestion that Mr. Marin 
failed to earlier object to plaintiff's attorney fee request for 
strategic reasons. And, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that his 
objection (filed two days prior to the issuance of the Final 
Judgment) was sufficiently "raised to a level of consciousness 
that the trial judge [could have] considered it." Groberg, 
supra, 2003 UT App 67, 1 19. The issue of attorney fees was, 
therefore, preserved for appeal. 
IV. THE COURT CAN CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AND THIS CASE INVOLVES 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
If the Court determines that Mr. Marin failed to preserve 
the issue of attorney fees for appeal, it may still consider the 
issue of fees because the trial court committed plain error and 
this case involves exceptional circumstances. See View 
Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, 2004 UT App 104, 1 37, 90 P.3d 
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1042 (citing State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993)) (appellate courts will generally not consider an issue 
raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances). 
(A) The Trial Court's Award of Attorney Fees is Plainly 
Erroneous. 
(i) The trial court failed to make findings of fact 
supported by the evidence and appropriate 
conclusions of law. 
"An award of attorney fees must generally be made on the 
basis of findings of fact supported by the evidence and 
appropriate conclusions of law." Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 
622, 624 (Utah 1985)(citing Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 
103 (Utah 1983))(other citations omitted). One of the issues 
before the Court in Cabrera was whether the trial court committed 
plain error in awarding attorney fees without making a finding of 
reasonableness. The Court upheld the award even though the trial 
court did not enter findings and conclusions separate from its 
order and judgment because the order and judgment itself 
contained findings and legal conclusions, including a finding 
that the fee award was reasonable. The Court explained that: 
As a matter of form, it would have been preferable for the 
trial court to have entered separate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in addition to the order and judgment for 
attorney fees, but the order and judgment are not defective 
because they are combined with findings and conclusions. 
12 
694 P.2d at 625. 
In the case at bar, however, the trial court did not make 
any findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to Young 
Living's attorney fee request. And, unlike Cabrera, there is no 
finding of reasonableness in the Final Judgment. 
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the trial court 
committed plain error by awarding attorney fees without making 
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(ii) Young Living is not entitled to recover attorney 
fees related to its tort and other non-contract 
claims. 
In Utah, attorney fees are recoverable only if authorized by 
statute or contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 
988 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). Young Living relies on the 
following contractual provision to support its fee request: 
6.1 MARIN hereby agrees to indemnify and save Company and 
hold Company harmless in respect to all causes of 
action, liabilities, costs, charges and expenses, loss 
and damage (including consequential loss) suffered or 
incurred by Company (including legal fees) arising from 
any willful or grossly negligent act or omission of 
MARIN or his employees, servants and agents or arising 
from contravention by MARIN of [sic] any of its [sic] 
employees, servants, and agents of any of the terms and 
conditions imposed on MARIN pursuant to this Agreement. 
(R. 10) 
In its Complaint, Young Living alleged six causes of action, 
entitled in order: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Unjust Enrichment; 
(3) Quantum'Meruit; (4) Fraud; (5) Breach of Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (6) Negligent Misrepresentation. 
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After the trial court granted summary judgment with respect to 
the breach of contract claim alleged in its First Cause of 
Action, Young Living voluntarily dismissed its Second through 
Sixth Causes of Action. Accordingly, the only cause of action 
with respect to which Young Living might be entitled to an award 
of attorney fees is the breach of contract claim alleged in the 
First Cause of Action. 
The trial court, however, granted summary judgment in Young 
Living's favor on the breach of contract claim at the conclusion 
of the hearing held October 1, 2007. Yet, Young Living seeks to 
recover tens of thousands of dollars in attorney fees incurred 
during the eight months after that date (R. 470-465), nearly all 
of which were related either to the tort and non-contract claims 
alleged in the Second through Sixth Causes of Action or to 
litigating "Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Form of 
Order" and "Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider" upon which Young 
Living did not prevail. (R. 392, 448) 
In Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325, the Court 
recognized not only that an award of attorney fees must be based 
upon "specific findings of fact," but also that the party 
requesting attorney fees must "categorize the time and fees 
expended for 'successful claims for which there may be an 
entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which 
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
14 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to 
attorney fees.'" Id. at 1132 (quoting Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 
52, 54 (Utah 1998) . 
Noncompliance with these requirements makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, for the trial court to award the moving 
party fees because there is insufficient evidence to support 
the award. 
Id. 
Thus, in the case at bar, not only did the trial court 
commit plain error by not making specific findings of fact, but 
it did not have sufficient evidence to support an award of 
attorney fees because Young Living failed to properly categorize 
its fee request. 
(iii) Young Living is not entitled to recover attorney 
fees in connection with issues on which it did 
not prevail. 
The trial court committed plain error by awarding Young 
Living attorney fees in connection with matters on which it did 
not prevail. See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah 
1998)("the court should not reimburse counsel for time spent 
pursuing ungrounded and infeasible theories of recovery); and 
Gardner v. Madsen, 949 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(trial 
court should make adjustments to fee request so that the 
prevailing party "does not recover fees attributable to issues on 
which he did not prevail") ., Young Living seeks thousands of 
dollars in attorney fees incurred in litigating "Defendant's 
Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Form of Order" and "Plaintiff's 
15 
Motion to Reconsider." (R. 470-465) The trial court, however, 
sustained Mr. Marin's objections to Young Living's proposed form 
of order (R. 392) and denied Young Living's Motion to Reconsider. 
(R. 448) Mr. Marin respectfully submits that it was plainly 
erroneous for the trial court to reimburse Young Living for time 
spent on ungrounded and infeasible theories and upon matters on 
which it did not prevail. 
(B) This Case Involves Exceptional Circumstances. 
Finally, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the following 
exceptional circumstances would justify the Court in considering 
the issue of attorney fees. 
1. Young Living failed to comply with the time requirements 
of Rule 7, URCP, and should not be heard to complain of Mr. 
Marin's failure to do so. Young Living filed its Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on March 21, 2007. (R. 74) Mr. Marin 
timely filed his Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 4, 2007. 
(R. 119) Young Living did not file its reply/response memorandum 
until August 13, 2007, nearly four months after it was due. (R. 
170) 
Similarly, the Order granting Young Living's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment was entered March 26, 2008. (R. 462) 
In accordance with Rule 7(f)(2), Young Living should have served 
a proposed form of judgment within "fifteen days after the 
16 
court's decision." The Proposed Final Judgment was not served 
until May 27, 2008, 44 days late. (R. 505) 
2. The trial court did not proceed in accordance with Rule 
7, URCP. As set forth above, the trial court prematurely entered 
the Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action on June 12, 2008. (R. 
502) It did so not only prior to the filing of Mr. Marin's 
response memorandum, but prior to the time when Mr. Marin's 
response memorandum was due, prior to the filing of plaintiff's 
Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Voluntary 
Dismissal on June 23, 2008 (R.510), and without either party 
having filed a "Request to Submit for Decision" in accordance 
with Rule 7(d), URCP. 
Accordingly, because neither Young Living nor the trial 
court proceeded in accordance with the requirements of Rule 7, it 
would not be reasonable to now hold Mr. Marin strictly to those 
requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing additional reasons, Mr. Marin respectfully 
requests that the trial court's March 26, 2008 Order granting 
plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be reversed, that 
the Final Judgment be vacated, and that this case be remanded to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
Court's decision. 
17 
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